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 BILL WRINGE
 WHY PUNISH WAR CRIMES? VICTOR'S JUSTICE AND
 EXPRESSIVE JUSTIFICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT
 (Accepted 21 December 2004)
 I. INTRODUCTION
 Many people hold that atrocities committed in times of war
 should be punished. This straightforward moral claim might be
 justified in a number of ways. One would be to argue that those
 who have committed such crimes deserve punishment simply
 because punishment is an appropriate response to moral
 atrocity.1 On this view, the fact that the atrocities have occurred
 in time of war is of no special moral significance: the onus is
 rather on those who hold that war crimes should not be pun
 ished to provide a cogent justification for their view.
 An alternative approach is to claim that if war criminals are
 punished, those who are tempted to commit atrocities in future
 wars are may be deterred from doing so.2 This view could be
 based on a consequentialist approach to the justification of
 punishment as a whole. However it could equally be combined
 with a rejection of such an approach to punishment in general.
 On a view of this sort the punishment of war crimes would be
 seen as a special case, requiring a different sort of justification
 from that which was applicable to the institution of punishment
 as a whole. Such a view might be motivated by the thought that
 straightforward justifications of punishment break down, for
 one reason or another, in the case of war crimes, but that
 1 I have in mind so-called 'retributivist' theories. However it is worth
 bearing in mind that this label covers a variety of different views - for
 discussion see John Cottingham, The Varieties of Retribution', Philosoph
 ical Quarterly 29 (1979), 238-246.
 2 See for example Anthony Ellis, 'What Should We Do With War
 Criminals', in Aleksandr Jokic (ed.), War Crimes and Collective Responsi
 bility: A Reader (Maiden MA: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 97-113.
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 nonetheless it must be possible to find some justification for
 punishing war crimes.
 However, these two approaches do not exhaust the range of
 possible justifications for punishing war crimes. A third ap
 proach, less frequently discussed in the philosophical literature
 on punishment, is that either the very institution of punishment
 or some specific features or instances of it are best justified by
 reference to its expressive function. On this view, what justifies
 the punishment of war criminals - and perhaps criminals in
 general - is that such punishments communicate or express
 particular messages.3
 In this paper, I shall be arguing that the best way of justi
 fying our present practices of punishing war crimes is by
 adopting the third sort of account. My claim will be that other
 purported justifications of our current practice are undermined
 by the ways in which it is selective. To be more specific, they are
 undermined by the fact that as things stand it is almost
 invariably those who come out on the losing side in wars who
 end up being punished. However, such facts do not undermine
 what I shall call an expressive justification of punishment.
 In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be responding to a
 recent exchange between Burleigh Wilkins4 and Anthony Ellis.5
 As I shall outline below, Wilkins argues that the ways in which
 war crimes trials are selective undermine the legitimacy of
 punishments for war crimes. His focus is on justifications of
 3 For examples of such views see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explana
 tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Anthony Duff, Trials and
 Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and Punish
 ment Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
 2000); Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford Uni
 versity Press); Uma Narayan, 'Appropriate Responses and Preventive
 Benefits: Justifying Censure and Hard Treatment in Legal Punishment',
 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13 (1993), 166-182. See also, for critical
 discussion, Anthony Skillen, 'How to Say Things With Walls', Philosophy
 55 (1980), 509-523; Igor Primoratz, 'Punishment as Language', Philosophy
 64 (1989), 187-205 and contributions to Matravers, M. (ed.) Punishment and
 Political Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999).
 4 Wilkins, B., 'Whose Trials? Whose Reconciliation?', in Jokic op. cit. pp.
 85-96.
 5 Ellis op. cit.
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 punishment that work along retributivist lines. One natural
 response is to suggest (as Ellis does) that the selectivity of war
 crimes trials can be justified along consequentialist lines by
 reference to claims about the public interest.6 I shall argue that
 this response fails: public interest considerations do not succeed
 in showing that where war crimes are concerned our current
 punishment practices are justified. I shall then go on to outline
 an alternative, expressivist account of punishment which suc
 ceeds where Ellis's fails.
 Before I embark on this task, though, I need to make two
 preliminary points. The first concerns the focus of my argu
 ments. I shall be mostly concerned with arguments about
 whether and how our present practices of punishing war
 criminals (or something like them) can be justified. I think it is
 important to argue - in the face of reasoned claims to the
 contrary, which I shall be discussing below - that we are jus
 tified in punishing those war criminals whom we actually do
 punish. To do so is not to claim that our current practice
 cannot be improved upon. Nothing in what follows should be
 taken as an argument to this effect. In fact I think that there are
 good reasons for supporting efforts to build and strengthen the
 impartiality of existing international tribunals, and for seeking
 to punish individuals whose commission of war crimes is cur
 rently overlooked for reasons of political expediency. But the
 claim that unless we reform our current practices we are not
 justified in punishing those war criminals who we do punish is
 not one of them.
 One might object to my focus on our current practices along
 the following sorts of lines: concerns about this sort of selec
 tivity show conclusively that our current practices of punishing
 war criminals are unjustifiable. But they do not show that there
 would be anything wrong with reformed versions of these
 practices - for example with situations in which individuals
 who were guilty of war crimes were punished by their own
 states, or by international tribunals that were more genuinely
 impartial than those that currently exist. This line of thought,
 although tempting, begs the question against the line of thought
 6 Ellis op. cit. pp. 101-102.
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 I shall be considering. For I shall argue that although these
 facts undermine some sorts of justification for our present
 practice, they do not undermine the one I shall be defending.
 The second preliminary point is about the scope of the ver
 sion of expressivism I shall be defending. I want to emphasise
 that for the purposes of this paper I am not putting forward the
 expressive account as a general account of the justification of
 punishment. In particular, I shall not be concerned with con
 vincing someone who has doubts about whether it can ever be
 right to mete out harsh treatment to criminals - for example, on
 the grounds that such treatment infringes their rights. I shall
 assume that some account of how punishment can be justified
 in normal cases can be provided.7 Instead I shall focus on the
 particular case of the punishment of war crimes.
 I take this narrow focus to be justified for two reasons. First,
 the punishment of war crimes typically takes place in ways that
 place it outside of the normal workings of the established legal
 systems of states trying their own citizens. For this reason, there
 are prima facie grounds for taking the practice to raise its own
 peculiar philosophical problems. Secondly, the particular
 problem about punishing war crimes that I will be trying to
 address is one that does not have any obvious analogue for the
 case of punishment in general.8
 One consequence of the view that I will be defending is that
 there is something non-standard about justifications for the
 punishment of war criminals. I do not take this to count against
 what I say but rather to be an attraction of my view. If, as I
 shall be arguing, there is something unusual about the way in
 which punishments of war criminals are to be justified, this
 7 Indeed one feature of my view about the punishment of war crimes is
 that it can only be made plausible if some more general account of the
 justification of punishment in more standard cases can be provided. How
 ever, my account it does not depend on details of the form that this justi
 fication must take, and for that reason, I shall be comparatively
 unconcerned with them. (In particular, I do not assume this justification
 must take an expressivist form.)
 8 See pp. 5-6 below for the reasons why and pp. 9-10 for further dis
 cussion.
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 explains why the topic is one that invites controversy and dis
 agreement.
 II. VICTORS' JUSTICE
 As I have already observed, many people think that (at least
 some) war criminals should be punished. However, there are
 dissenters. In some cases, their views are based on either cyni
 cism or political expediency. I shall not be concerned with such
 considerations here. Nor shall I be concerned with objections to
 the punishment of war criminals that are based solely or pri
 marily on considerations of the practical difficulties of finding,
 trying, and imposing penalties on those who have perpetrated
 war crimes. While these difficulties are considerable, and do
 have some bearing on our assessment of our current practice,
 they cannot decide the case in the absence of further, more
 philosophically grounded argumentation. No-one thinks that it
 is literally impossible to hold war criminals accountable for
 their actions: those who emphasise the difficulties involved in
 doing so are in effect pointing out the costs of such action. But
 this raises the question of whether those costs are worth bearing
 and under what circumstances - and this is not a question that
 can be answered without further argument.9'10
 9 This paragraph should not be taken as endorsing a form of conse
 quentialism. There can be all sorts of reasons why the costs of a particular
 line of action are or are not worth bearing - not all of them have to do with
 the possibility of there being countervailing benefits. The point here is that
 the most that can be claimed by someone impressed by the practical diffi
 culty of bringing the perpetrators of war crimes to trial is that these costs
 may be very large. All I am saying here is that an acknowledgment of this
 fact cannot pre-empt further moral debate.
 10 I here avoid discussion of whether the punishment of war crimes can
 legitimately be called 'punishment' on the alleged grounds that it is a con
 ceptual truth for something to be punishment it must be enforced by an
 established legal system, a standard from which much of what is usually
 counted as punishment of war crimes falls short. My main concern is
 whether a certain practice, typically called 'punishment' is justifiable, and
 not whether that practice should in fact be called punishment. None of this
 should be taken to imply that I take the question of whether the punishment
 of war crimes takes a legal form to be unimportant: see pp. 17-18 below.
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 More principled objections to the idea of punishing war
 crimes often appeal to the idea that such punishments only
 embody 'victors' justice' rather than real justice. The notion of
 victor's justice is a complex one, and it would take us a long
 way afield to disentangle the various strands that go to make it
 up.11 However one concern which plays a significant role here is
 that in practice the trial and punishment of war criminals by
 international tribunals does not represent the application of
 impartial moral principles to individuals on both sides of
 conflicts. Instead it typically only involves the inflicting of harsh
 treatment on selected members of the losing side.12
 This concern is based on the following observation. In many,
 if not all, wars, atrocities are committed by both sides. How
 ever, when we look at war crimes trials we find that it is almost
 invariably those on the losing side who are tried and punished.
 We do not, for example, find the men who ordered the fire
 bombing of Dresden standing trial alongside the Nazis at
 Nuremberg even though these men's actions were as much in
 breach of the war crimes convention as those of the men who
 were responsible for Nazi atrocities in Occupied France.
 This observation gives rise to an awkward suspicion. It is that
 there is a sense in which those who are guilty of war crimes are not
 just being punished for the atrocities they have committed. They
 are also being punished for the 'crime' of being on the losing side.
 This suspicion can be articulated more clearly by casting it as a
 point about luck. Whether one ends up on the winning side or the
 losing side in a war is largely a matter of luck. Only an incurable
 optimist could think that the fact that someone had ended up on
 the winning side rather than the losing side in a war was some
 kind of evidence for the moral superiority of their cause. How
 11 Other aspects of the notion of 'Victor's Justice' which I do not discuss
 here are the question of whether punishing individuals for war crimes in
 volves anything analogous to retrospective legislation and the issue of
 whether there are problems about punishing heads of states and other
 government officials for official acts. I am grateful to Efraim Podoksik and
 to an anonymous referee for Law and Philosophy for helping me to disen
 tangle several important issues here.
 12 In emphasising this aspect of the notion of Victor's Justice I am fol
 lowing Wilkins op. cit.
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 ever, it is natural to think that matters of luck should be irrelevant
 to how seriously one is punished for crimes that one has com
 mitted. Any system of justice which institutionalises them is to
 that extent inadequate.13
 The significance of the 'Victor's Justice' objection can be
 illustrated by considering an analogy with a case of domestic
 punishment. Suppose the proportion of those who are impris
 oned for dangerous driving who are university teachers in their
 thirties turns out to be noticeably greater than the proportion
 of drivers who are in their thirties who are university teachers.
 There is a prima facie case for thinking there is something
 wrong here.
 It is, of course, only & prima facie case.14 There may be good
 reasons why 30-year-old university teachers should be dispro
 portionately punished for driving offences. Perhaps their psy
 chological make-up makes them likely to be reckless drivers, or
 perhaps they have more opportunity to drive dangerously.
 Nevertheless, in the absence of such an explanation we may
 well feel that there is something amiss. Something similar will
 be true if we think that the explanation has nothing to do with
 how likely university lecturers are to drive dangerously - for
 13 The point that I am making is supposed to be a fairly narrow one - it
 only concerns the role which luck should play in the treatment of two
 individuals who are guilty of the same offence. It is arguable that luck can
 play a role in determining which offence an individual is guilty of: a lucky
 miss may turn someone who would otherwise have been a murderer into
 someone who is guilty of only attempted murder, and thus, in some cir
 cumstances make them liable for a lighter penalty. Although some authors
 think that there is an injustice in allowing luck of this sort ('outcome luck')
 to play in determining what offence an individual has committed (see e.g.
 Ashworth, A., 'Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under
 the Code and in the Common Law', Rutgers Law Journal 19 (1988), 725
 772), I disagree: I think that the justice of a punishment can depend on what
 an individual has actually managed to do, and not merely what they have
 tried to do. For an argument for this conclusion on expressivist grounds see
 Duff, R.A., Criminal Attempts (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996) especially
 chapter 12. Note that this is entirely consistent with thinking that there is an
 injustice in allowing luck to influence our treatment of different individuals
 who have committed the same offence.
 14 cf Ellis op. cit. pp. 98-99.
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 example, if police speed traps are being deliberately set up near
 university campuses with the aim of discrediting prominent
 academics.15
 III. RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE VICTOR'S JUSTICE OBJECTION
 The 'Victor's Justice' objection suggests that justifications for
 punishing war crimes may undermined by the fact such pun
 ishments fail to meet an intuitive constraint. The constraint is
 that punishments should be inflicted for non-arbitrary reasons.
 Seen in this way, it can be understood as drawing its force from
 a general moral requirement that judicial actions should be
 non-arbitrary.16
 However, it is plausible that if this is a general moral
 requirement, then it is one that is based on some more abstract
 principles. And, for all that has been said so far, it is at least an
 open possibility that once we see what principles are involved we
 will see that they need to be qualified when the treatment of war
 15 This example may seem to trivialise a serious matter. The triviality is
 deliberate - the point of it is to illustrate a general principle by reference to a
 case where our intuitions are unlikely to be affected by prior intellectual
 commitments. But the principle illuminates other less trivial situations. For
 example it is sometimes argued, on the basis of statistics which seem to show
 that women who are convicted of committing violent crimes are typically
 sentenced more severely than men who are convicted of committing crimes
 of equal violence, that the British criminal justice system discriminates
 against women. An inference drawn from these statistics is that something
 other than the gravity of the offence has played a role in determining the
 severity of the sentence these women receive, and this is prima facie evidence
 of injustice. Similar considerations are also invoked - as Wilkins points out
 - in discussions of capital punishment within the United States: here the
 facts that black defendants are in general more likely to be convicted, and
 when convicted more likely to be sentenced to death is often taken as evi
 dence that there is something amiss with capital punishment if not in
 principle then at least as currently practiced within the United States.
 16 Some might think that it derives from a conceptual requirement that for
 something to count as punishment it must be inflicted on non-arbitrary
 grounds. However I find appeals to supposed conceptual requirements of
 this sort unconvincing: see Herbert Hart, 'A Prolegomenon to the Principles
 of Punishment', in his Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford
 University Press, 1968), pp. 1-27 for a fuller discussion.
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 criminals is at issue. However, I do not think that this is the case.
 Or rather, I think that many well-known theories of punishment
 give us good grounds for endorsing the principle and no partic
 ular reason for qualifying it in the case of war criminals.
 Theories of punishment are often categorised as being either
 retributivist or consequentialist. I shall try to show that the
 Victor's Justice objection presents prima facie difficulties for
 advocates of standard forms of each view. My discussion here is
 not intended to be exhaustive: a full treatment of every possible
 variant of each kind of view would be impossibly long. Nev
 ertheless I shall try to show why I do not think that some of the
 more obvious variants on standard views seem unlikely to de
 fuse the problem.
 I shall start by considering retributivist accounts of punish
 ment. A central element in such accounts is that the wrongness
 of a particular kind of action itself justifies the inflicting of
 whatever form of harsh treatment it is that constitutes pun
 ishment in a particular case. The justification is, in this respect,
 backward-looking: it does not depend on the sorts of effect that
 the punishment has or might reasonably be expected to have.17
 An important aspect of retributivist views is that harsh
 treatment as a result of wrongdoing is only morally permissible
 if it is inflicted for the right sort of reason. One way of making
 this point is by considering our reactions to cases where
 wrongdoers undergo harm for the wrong sort of reason.
 17 Here and elsewhere in this paper, I take the task of justifying a form of
 punitive practice to involve showing that it is morally permissible and
 rationally good. I do not take it to involve showing that it is either rationally
 or morally required: an attempted justification of a punitive institution
 would not fail if there were some occasions on which there were overriding
 countervailing considerations (although the arguments of this paper place
 fairly strict limits on what sorts of countervailing considerations might be
 acceptable); or alternative institutions and practices which would fulfil the
 same role. On the other hand, a justification of the institution must do more
 than show it is morally permissible - given the great difficulties and costs
 involved in hunting down, trying and punishing war criminals, an account
 which merely showed that this was merely morally permissible would leave
 the question of whether we should actually engage in it wide open. (I'd like
 to thank an anonymous referee for Law and Philosophy for pressing this
 question.)
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 Consider a case where a criminal is accidentally shot by a
 policeman in the course of his duties. We may find the police
 man's action excusable in a situation where he/she is trying to
 prevent a crime or where a criminal is resisting arrest. But it is
 in general not true that the mere fact that a crime has been
 committed makes the policeman's action excusable.
 Furthermore, this intuition can be given theoretical backing.
 A central concern of retributivist accounts of punishment is
 that the moral permissibility of harsh treatment for offenders
 depends on its being directed at the particular individual who
 has committed the offence. One obvious way in which this
 constraint can fail to be met, often emphasised by retributivist
 critics of consequentialist accounts, is if the purpose of the
 punishment is merely to deter other would-be offenders. But
 another is if the harsh treatment is received not because of the
 crime but for some other reason. This is precisely what gives the
 Victor's Justice account its bite when addressed to retributivist
 accounts of punishment.18 For what the Victor's Justice
 objection suggests is that when war criminals receive harsh
 treatment, they are not receiving this harsh treatment because
 of the crimes they have committed but for some other reason.
 This point is not unanswerable. A defender of the punishment
 of war crimes who was attached to a retributivist account of
 punishment might take one of two deflationary lines. First, she
 might deny the interest of the Victor's Justice objection. She might
 say that the Victor's Justice objection does not show that the
 punishment of war criminals is never justified. It shows that there
 are certain contingent (but perhaps fairly widespread) circum
 stances in which such punishments are not justified. One could
 develop this point by arguing that we could, in principle develop
 international tribunals, which would allow for the impartial
 punishment of participants on both sides of any conflict.
 However, the prospect of war criminals being tried by
 international tribunals at some point in the future is also not
 enough to defuse the 'Victor's Justice' objection. The problem
 is not just that such tribunals do not currently exist. A further
 problem is that it is highly unlikely that powerful nations would
 18 Wilkins op. cit. pp. 86-87.
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 be likely to hand over their citizens to such tribunals except in
 circumstances where military defeat or diplomatic failure left
 them with no other option. So a justification for punishing war
 criminals which relied on the impartial operation of interna
 tional tribunals could be reasonably dismissed as Utopian.19
 An alternative response would be to say that the facts
 pointed to by the proponent of Victor's Justice objection are
 even less significant than the advocate of the first response
 suggested. It is not true, an advocate of this view might say,
 that those who are in fact punished for war crimes are being
 punished for the wrong sorts of reasons. After all, those who
 are punished (we may assume) have indeed committed such
 crimes. Their having committed those crimes plays at least
 some role in explaining why they have been singled out for
 punishment: it is not as if the punishment is meted out indis
 criminately to combatants on the losing side.
 19 Note that what I take to be Utopian is reliance on the impartial
 operation of such tribunals, rather than their actual establishment. My
 pessimism here is shared by Wilkins op cit pp. 88-89. Wilkins' view seems to
 have been borne out by more recent political events surrounding the
 establishment of such tribunals: it seems inconceivable that, for example, the
 United States will abandon its current attempts to undermine the estab
 lishment of an International Criminal Court at any point in the foreseeable
 future. To recognise this fact is not, of course, to applaud it. Nor should the
 attempt to show that the practice of trying alleged war criminals and pun
 ishing them in other fora is morally acceptable be taken as argument against
 the suggestion that practice of trying them in international tribunals would
 be an improvement on the status quo in various respects (including moral
 respects): I think it would. One can concede this, but still think that our
 current practice is morally acceptable (though capable of being improved on
 in various respects.) This is the view that I take. It is also perhaps worth
 noticing at this juncture that it is far from obvious that the establishment of
 international tribunals would itself be enough to dissolve the sorts of con
 cerns about Victor's Justice that I am concerned with here. For it is quite
 likely that even such tribunals would attend disproportionately to the ac
 tions of war criminals on the losing side in wars, and for very good reasons.
 Despite the fact that the Secretary General of the United Nations has de
 clared the recent war on Iraq illegal, the chance of any British citizen being
 tried for war crimes involved in the prosecution of that war strikes me as
 extremely remote, despite the fact that the British government supports the
 existence of institutions such as the International Criminal Court.
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 The case may be bolstered by considering situations that
 seem structurally analogous to the one under consideration.
 Consider first the case of a criminal who is caught and punished
 for an ordinary crime for which detection rates are low. Such a
 criminal might, perhaps, argue that they were being punished
 not because they had committed a crime but because they had
 been unlucky enough to be caught. But we would surely not
 consider this to be a justification for not punishing them. If we
 did, this would constitute a serious objection to most actual
 systems of punishment, since the point, though more graphic in
 situations where detection rates are low, seems just as com
 pelling in any situation where detection and conviction rates are
 less than 100%.
 However, there is a significant disanalogy between this sort
 of situation and the sort of situation to which the proponent of
 the Victor's Justice objection draws our attention. It is, of
 course, true that the fact that a criminal has been caught is part
 of the explanation of why he has come to be punished. But the
 fact that criminals who are not caught go unpunished does not
 undermine the claim that the punishment is directed at the
 perpetrator of the crime in the right sort of way. By contrast the
 points to which the proponents of the Victors' Justice objection
 draw our attention are ones which ought to undermine our
 confidence in thinking that the reasons why the punishment is
 carried out are the right ones.
 The salient difference between the two cases is the sort of
 factors that enter into the explanation of why the same
 punishment does not get inflicted on individuals who have
 committed the same crimes. In the case of the individual who
 has committed a crime for which detection rates are low, the
 explanation does not involve anyone's deliberate agency: no
 one has decided that those who don't get caught will be spared
 punishment.20 It's just an unfortunate fact that criminals who
 20 Matters might be different if, for example, a general amnesty for
 undetected crimes of the sort in question were declared after a certain period
 of time. But it isn't beyond controversy that such an amnesty would involve
 no injustice to those that had been tried and punished - however difficult we
 might find it to extend our sympathy to such individuals in the case of some
 crimes.
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 don't get caught can't be punished. But in the case of war
 crimes trials, agency is involved - that some types of individuals
 are tried and punished while others are not will depend on
 decisions made by particular individuals.
 IV. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE VICTOR'S JUSTICE
 OBJECTION
 Anthony Ellis has recently argued that the Victor's Justice
 objection, in the form in which I have presented it here, is far
 from compelling.21 Many of the points he makes depend on
 the details of the way in which the Victor's Justice objection
 is presented. For example, he argues that the intuitive
 requirement on just punishments that like cases be treated
 alike need not be violated in situations where members of one
 group are punished disproportionately. According to Ellis the
 most that facts about disproportionate punishment can show
 is that there is a prima facie case that people are being
 punished for morally irrelevant reasons. This prima facie case
 is one that may be rebuttable - for example if it can be
 shown that the facts about disproportionate punishment can
 be explained in other ways than by the supposition that
 people are being punished for irrelevant reasons. This point is
 one which I have conceded in my presentation of the Victor's
 Justice objection.
 However, to say that a case is rebuttable is not thereby to
 rebut it. Ellis suggests that in order to do so, we need to con
 sider the role which considerations of public interest can play in
 deciding whether to pursue a trial. As he points out, municipal
 law often gives prosecutors leeway on whether to proceed with
 prosecutions of crimes.22 Various considerations may be con
 sidered as legitimate reasons for not so proceeding. In partic
 ular, prosecutions need not be pursued when it would be
 against the public interest to do so.
 Ellis also suggests that a similar 'public interest' criterion can
 be applied in the case of prosecutions for war crimes. He also
 21 Ellis op. cit.
 22 Ellis op. cit. pp. 101-102.
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 argues that the operation of such a criterion can explain the
 asymmetrical treatment given to those accused of war crimes on
 winning and losing sides. Put bluntly, it would be massively
 against the public interest to do so. For example if the Allied
 leaders had set up war crimes tribunals with jurisdiction over
 their own actions 'there would have been virtually no public
 support for this at any level' (103); 'there would have been no
 serious chance of a conviction' (ibid) (so the whole exercise
 would presumably have been a massive waste of resources); and
 'If Churchill... had been found guilty of crimes against
 humanity... the results would have been catastrophic beyond
 imagining' (ibid).
 Of course, it is one thing to say that public interest consid
 erations are taken into account when deciding whether to
 proceed with prosecutions in the domestic case, and another to
 say that it is justifiable to allow them to do so. If Ellis' attempt
 to undermine the Victor's Justice objection is to succeed he
 needs to make the latter claim. However, this is something we
 should be cautious about conceding.
 Ellis says very little about why he takes the operation of
 public interest considerations in the domestic case to be
 defensible. However, in the light of his subsequent account of
 why he takes war crimes punishments to be defensible he ap
 peals to broadly consequentialist considerations. It does not
 seem unreasonable to think that similar considerations are in
 play in his account of the role of public interest considerations
 in undermining the Victor's Justice objection to punishing war
 crimes.
 One difficulty with a consequentialist account of the justifi
 cation of punishing war crimes is that it is very difficult to know
 what the consequences of this practice are and whether they are
 indeed beneficial. Does the policy deter individuals from com
 mitting atrocities, or does it make those who have done so more
 careful about covering up the evidence of their crimes, more
 tenacious in hanging on to power at any cost, and less likely to
 surrender when their military position is hopeless? It is difficult
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 to know, and difficult to see how we could have reliable
 information on this topic.23
 In any case, though, it is not clear that consequentialist con
 siderations can succeed in justifying the role which Ellis wishes
 public interest considerations to take in either municipal or
 international law. Two points are worth noticing here. The first is
 that it seems intuitively plausible that considerations of equal
 treatment might override public interest considerations in at least
 some cases. We would be very suspicious of a jurisdiction which
 prosecuted motoring offences by unemployed young black men
 much more frequently than similar offences by middle-aged
 white university lecturers, even if it offered the following sort of
 justification: 'Middle class university lecturers can usually afford
 fairly good legal representation, so the chances of securing a
 conviction are relatively low. Furthermore the level of outrage
 that a conviction might generate (in terms of letters to the press,
 23 This is not to say that if such information were available we would be
 justified in ignoring it. But it is perhaps worth saying something about more
 about why the efforts of historians and sociologists to dig into the empirical
 facts are unlikely to yield to us the sorts of answers that we would need in
 order to do a straightforward consequentialist calculation.
 The effects of war crimes trials on the conduct of individuals who are
 prosecuting wars is likely to depend a great deal on the circumstances of
 each particular war: the circumstances in which the war breaks out; the
 military culture of the opposing sides; the history of relations between
 combatants on both sides; the estimated chances of victory and conse
 quences of defeat; and so on. It is also likely to be affected by the ways in
 which prosecutions for war crimes have operated on previous occasions -
 and how they have been seen as operating by the combatants. Assessing the
 effects that these are likely to have in particular cases is something that
 might be possible - but probably not until a considerable time after they
 have taken place. This is no help to the consequentialist, who needs a way of
 judging the way in which the prospect of war crimes trials is likely to affect
 combatants in future wars rather than ones that have yet to take place.
 All this is compatible with believing (as I do) that looking at the messy
 details of the historical record may be illuminating in various ways - for
 example, in opening our eyes to possible unintended consequences of our
 actions, or extending our grasp of the sorts of factors that might affect
 people's decisions here. My quarrel is not with those who emphasise the
 significance of the concrete particular case, but with those who overestimate
 our capacity to generalise from them in a reliable manner.
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 complaints made to influential individuals) is much higher with
 university lecturers as they are articulate and often well-con
 nected. Finally, their behaviour is rarely regarded as a model
 which others might seek to emulate. So, given the limited re
 sources available for pursuing prosecutions of this sort, we would
 do well to ignore driving offences by offenders of this sort'.
 Furthermore, the intuitions that suggest this are not mere
 intuitions. They can be backed up by considerations to which
 someone with consequentialist leanings ought to be sympa
 thetic. The idea that diff?rent groups ought to be treated alike
 by the law is one that can be defended by means of consider
 ations which have nothing to do with the consequences of such
 a policy. However they can also be defended on consequen
 tialist grounds. For example, differential treatment of different
 groups justified along the lines suggested above are likely to
 lead to contempt for the law, both on the part of those who are
 treated leniently (since they may be inclined to notice and ex
 ploit their relative impunity) and those who are treated more
 harshly (since they are likely to become cynical). And contempt
 for the law may well lead to that law being more frequently
 disregarded.24,25
 Of course, one might respond that the amount of weight that
 can be given to public interest considerations will vary from
 case to case. If so, then it might be that while the factors to
 which I have pointed are reasons for being suspicious of
 prosecutorial discretion for traffic offences, they are not
 24 For clarity's sake, I should probably add the following. I take the moral
 intuition that a legal system that operated like this would be deserving of
 contempt to be a compelling one, without the consequentialist backing that
 I give it. But I take it that, presented with a mere intuition, a consequen
 tialist (of the sort I take Ellis to be) might merely bite the bullet and insist
 that the intuition was misleading: hence the need for an account of why a
 consequentialist should find the point compelling.
 25 To the objection that this consequentialist line of defence is mere story
 telling, the response is that the only person whose position is improved if
 this point is conceded is someone propounding a consequentialist story
 about why it is acceptable to rely on public interest considerations in this
 context. But someone who does hold this view is in no position to make the
 complaint, since his or her own position seems to rely on similar story
 telling.
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 similarly powerful when directed against prosecutorial discre
 tion for war crimes.
 An answer to this would be to say that this only points up
 a further problem for the defender of this view. The sort of
 consequentialism which is being appealed to in an account of
 the justification of a general form of punishment must be
 some form of indirect consequentialism, such as rule conse
 quentialism. But if so, then a question arises as to the
 appropriate level of generality for the sort of rules that we
 are taking to be justified by consideration of their conse
 quences.
 On the face of it we are confronted by a situation in which a
 general rule (to the effect that prosecutorial discretion on
 grounds of public interest should be disallowed) can be de
 fended by reference to its consequences, but comes into conflict
 with a less general rule (to the effect that prosecutorial discre
 tion can be allowed in the case of some types of trial but not of
 others), which can also be defended by reference to its conse
 quences.
 A defender of Ellis' position needs to do two things here.
 The first is to suggest and argue for a procedure for deciding
 what the appropriate level of generality for such rules to
 operate at might be. The second is to show that this procedure
 will deliver the sort of answer he needs. It is far from obvious
 that either can be done. But if not, then the attempt to rebut
 the Victor's Justice objection along the lines outlined here will
 fail.
 One further remark is worth making in this context. The
 response which I have considered concedes that the effects of
 prosecutorial discretion with respect to traffic offences may be
 importantly different from the effects of prosecutorial discre
 tion with respect to war crimes. But in fact, there is no reason
 why this should be conceded. On the face of it, it seems at least
 as likely that the effect of selective prosecution of war crimes
 will be to encourage contempt for attempts to enforce respect
 for human rights, as that it should do so in other sorts of cases.
 Indeed, given the relatively high visibility of war crimes trials
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 compared with other types of trial one might even think it more
 likely.26 Again, if this so the attempted rebuttal of the Victor's
 Justice objection will also fail.27
 V. EXPRESSIVE JUSTIFICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT
 INTRODUCED
 Consequentialist and retributivist accounts of the justification
 of punishment are not the only ones that exist. I do not want to
 review all the accounts that exist in the literature. Instead I
 want to focus on one particular idea which is helpful in this
 context. This is that the expressive function of punishment
 plays a role in the justification of at least some forms of pun
 ishment.
 The idea that punishment has an expressive function is often
 traced back to Joel Feinberg's essay 'The Expressive Theory of
 Punishment'.28 In this essay, Feinberg argues that it is part of
 the concept of punishment that punishment should express
 social disapproval of a particular form of behaviour. One rea
 son which he gives for thinking so is that if we do not under
 stand the notion of punishment in this way, it is impossible to
 make what seems like a morally and legally significant dis
 tinction between punishment on the one hand and non-punitive
 actions undertaken by a state in order to discourage certain
 forms of behaviour - such as high taxes on cigarettes imposed
 to discourage smoking.
 26 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Law and Philosophy for
 suggesting this point to me.
 27 One anonymous referee has commented unfavourably on the somewhat
 speculative nature of the considerations that I have adduced in arguing
 against the consequentialist rebuttal of the Victor's Justice objection in this
 section. However, I take it that I have at least established that someone who
 wants to argue against the objection in (what I take to be) Ellis' way needs
 to show that the possibilities that I have drawn attention to are not actual.
 Clearly, it would take more to establish a consequentialist case for my own
 view - something I make no claim to have done.
 28 Joel Feinberg, 'The Expressive Function of Punishment', in Joel Fein
 berg (ed.), Doing and Deserving (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,
 1970), pp. 95-118.
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 I shall not endorse Feinberg's suggestion that it is part of the
 concept of punishment that punishment should express social
 disapproval. Whether or not the claim is true Feinberg's
 arguments for it do not seem conclusive. However his discus
 sion suggests two weaker and more plausible claims, which
 have been taken up in the more recent philosophical literature
 on punishment.29 One is that instituting and enforcing pun
 ishments is one way in which society can express its disapproval
 of a form of behaviour. The second is that this may itself be a
 legitimate (moral) ground for punishing some forms of
 behaviour. I shall refer to the conjunction of these two claims as
 the 'Expressive Justification of Punishment'.30
 Adherence to the sort of expressive account of punishment
 that I have sketched here need not be derived from any more
 general moral theory. This is not to say that someone who
 holds the view can give no account of why it is legitimate for
 society to express its disapproval in certain ways - they may
 have a number of illuminating things to say about this. For
 example, they might hold that communities of a particular,
 desirable, type (for example, liberal communities of citizens
 who are largely, if not without exception law-abiding) can only
 29 For examples of such work, see the references given under footnote 3. It
 is interesting, though not especially significant for the course of my argu
 ment, that Feinberg's original development of the expressivist position is in
 some ways unrepresentative since it does not adopt the anti-consequentialist
 approach adopted by most of these more recent authors. In fact many of
 Feinberg's concerns are very different from mine: rather than thinking that
 the expressive role of punishment might play a role in justifying punishment,
 he seems to hold that it might be a reason for holding many punishments to
 be unjustified. However it is not clear why harsh treatment with an
 expressive purpose should be unfair. One thought that might be relevant
 here is the possibility that the expressive function could be served by some
 means, which did not involve harming the wrongdoer - I discuss this issue
 below.
 30 This is, of course, a very thin account of what laws and social institu
 tions can be expressive of and the ways in which they can be expressive.
 More detailed and finally nuanced accounts have been developed of the
 expressive function played by particular laws or legislative programs: see for
 example, Gusfield, J., Symbolic Crusade (Urbana: University of Illinois
 Press, 1962) and Garland, D., Punishment and Modern Society (Oxford:
 Clarendon Press, 1992) for interesting examples of this work.
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 exist, and their citizens can only flourish if the society gives
 public expression to certain moral norms. However even if a
 view of this sort does lie behind an endorsement of the
 expressive account they need not be justified by reference to an
 overarching consequentialist or Kantian view.31,32
 The view of punishment that I am putting forward should
 be distinguished from a similar view, which has recently been
 defended by Anthony Duff. On Duffs view, which he calls a
 communicative account of punishment, punishment is justi
 fied (to the extent that it can be) by the fact that it is a
 legitimate attempt to communicate to a wrongdoer the nat
 ure of his wrongdoing. My view differs from Duffs in two
 important respects. The first is that for Duff the focus, or
 intended audience for the communication is, at least in the
 first instance, the wrongdoer. On my view the intended
 audience may be considerably wider - not just, or even pri
 marily the wrongdoer, but the society itself or even the world
 at large.33
 A second important difference between my view and Duffs
 is in his account of the intended scope of the sort of justification
 of punishment that he offers. On Duffs view, the legitimacy of
 punishment depends on the person receiving the punishment
 being a member of the community against whose norms he has
 offended. The paradigmatic example of such a community, and
 the one that Duff seems most often to have in mind, is of course
 31 Since my version of expressivism is slightly non-standard, I shall wait
 until I have put forward more of the details of the view before saying why I
 take the expressive defence of certain kinds of punishment to succeed. See
 below pp. 6ff.
 32 On some accounts of what liberalism is, communities of this sort could
 not be liberal communities, since liberal communities must avoid promoting
 any particular conception of the good, but must be neutral between such
 conception. However, I follow Raz (Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)) and Duff (op. cit. 2000, chapter 2)
 in holding that liberal communities are not neutral between conceptions of
 the good but rather promote a particular type of conception of the good -
 one in which autonomy plays a central role.
 33 To use Narayan's terminology (Narayan op. cit.), on my account the
 justification of punishment depends on its being denunciatory rather than
 communicative.
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 the contemporary liberal state.34 Nothing Duff says rules out
 the possibility of other communities - and in particular inter
 national communities - existing. Nevertheless this feature of his
 account seems to present a prima facie challenge to the possi
 bility of extending it to provide a justification of the punish
 ment of war criminals. It is, after all, characteristic of war
 crimes trials that they involve punishments being imposed on
 individuals who might reasonably reject the claim that they
 belonged to the community which is imposing a punishment on
 them.
 VI. EXPRESSIVISM AND HARD TREATMENT
 Advocates of an expressive theory of punishment need to an
 swer the following challenge. Suppose it is agreed that pun
 ishment is a way of expressing social disapproval of certain
 actions, and suppose it is also agreed that it is legitimate for a
 society to express disapproval of actions of this sort. We might
 still wonder whether punishment was the only way in which
 society could express the relevant sort of disapproval. If it was
 we would need an explanation of why this should be so. If it
 was not, we might be inclined to think that the theory had not
 really succeeded in justifying punishment, given that there
 might be reasons for preferring some other way of expressing
 social disapproval.35
 Consider someone who thinks that it is legitimate for society
 to express disapproval of certain actions but thinks that this is
 not enough to justify inflicting harsh treatment on offenders.
 He might argue that society could express its disapproval of
 whatever actions were in question by providing for occasions
 on which prominent members of the society made public
 denunciations of the perpetrators of such actions. This objec
 tion to the expressive justification of that justification might
 seem 'merely philosophical' (in the pejorative sense) if cast in
 34 Duff does consider other kinds of community such as monasteries and
 universities. However, the point of doing so seems to be as a way of pro
 viding support for his conclusions about punishment within a liberal state.
 35 This possibility is suggested by Skillen op. cit. A similar worry is
 expressed by von Hirsch op. cit.
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 entirely general terms. However it is not such a silly objection
 when applied to the punishment of war crimes. For it might be
 thought that society typically does - or at least can - show its
 disapproval of acts of this sort in many different ways.
 One response to this suggestion is that if the expressive view
 is to seem plausible then the sort of expression of disapproval
 that we are interested in must be one that is clearly sincere. And
 it is arguable that in at least some cases, the conduct of a society
 that allowed for public denunciations of criminal behaviour but
 allowed those who engaged in it to do so without taking further
 action against them would not be sincere.36
 This seems a reasonable response to someone whose worry is
 that the expressive theory of punishment would, in general, not
 justify sufficiently harsh punishments (especially for war crim
 inals). Equally, though, someone might worry that the theory
 could be used to justify harsher treatment of war criminals than
 we are likely to think appropriate. If punishment is justified
 because it is a justifiable form of social disapproval of certain
 actions, why go to all the trouble and expense of actually trying
 war criminals? After all, in many cases their guilt is not in any
 real doubt. And in some cases it is arguable that war criminals
 derive unreasonable benefit from the states that try them being
 determined to go through the form of a fair trial.
 VII. JUSTIFYING WAR CRIMES TRIALS
 My response to this problem is to suggest a more subtle form of
 expressivism. We should not just consider the expressive role of
 punishment but the expressive role of the legal process. An
 account of this sort will explain not just why we feel justified in
 inflicting harsh treatment on war criminals but also why we
 take it to be important that these punishments should be in
 flicted according to legal forms - even when, as is often the case,
 the legal standing of such tribunals is extremely dubious.
 This raises the following question: what could the expressive
 purpose of war crimes trials be? The answer cannot be that the
 36 Similar points have been made by Primoratz op. cit., Narayan op. cit.,
 Baldwin 'Punishment Communication and Resentment' in Matravers op.
 cit.
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Thu, 12 Jul 2018 10:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 WHY PUNISH WAR CRIMES?  181
 purpose is the expression of disapproval of the actions that they
 are alleged to have committed. It may be painful to be subjected
 to legal proceedings. But we do not normally see this as a way
 of expressing disapproval of the alleged actions that the pro
 ceedings are about. This is made clear by the fact that we do not
 necessarily see it as a mark of societal disapproval when
 someone is subjected to civil legal proceedings.
 The answer might be that the practice of subjecting war
 criminals to quasi-legal processes expresses a commitment to a
 certain ideal of justice37. It is difficult to be precise about what
 the content of this ideal might be. But it is plausible that it
 might include at least the following ideas. The first is that the
 use of power by those that have it not be entirely uncon
 strained. The second is that that power should not be exercised
 in a way that gives no voice to those over whom it is exercised.
 This suggestion raises an important question - namely, why we
 should regard this as an ideal to which a society ought to ex
 press a public commitment. The second is whether, even
 granted that the expression of commitment to such an ideal is
 valuable, it can be invoked as a justification for trying war
 criminals.
 Few reflective people would want to deny that the use of
 power should be unconstrained, or that the constraints on its
 use should be ones that give a voice to those over whom it is
 exercised. To say this is to say that one sort of political freedom
 - the sort that involves independence from the arbitrary will of
 others - is widely acknowledged to be valuable. However, to
 say this is not yet to say that the public expression of such a
 37 'Express a commitment to a certain ideal of justice' is intended to mean
 more in this context than just 'act in such a way as one would act if one were
 so committed'. On this minimalist reading of the word 'express', it is not
 clear what would be contributed to the defence of the practise of punishing
 war crimes by the suggestion that they express such a commitment. I take
 'express a commitment' here to mean something like 'make a public dec
 laration of a commitment'. Given this reading, it will that it is a consequence
 of the expressivist account that it is important that trials are in some sense
 public events. It is not clear to me that this would be a consequence of my
 view on a more minimalist reading of 'express'. (I would like to thank an
 anonymous referee for Law and Philosophy for insisting on clarification
 here.)
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 commitment, and in particular its public expression through the
 judicial process is valuable. Nevertheless, it is possible to con
 struct an argument linking the two. For one reason for thinking
 that this sort of independence from arbitrary wills is important
 is that it is good for the citizens of a state that power should be
 constrained in such a way. It is good not necessarily because it
 is what they prefer or because it is liable to make them happy,
 but because it is more likely to let them develop into virtuous
 citizens. On this view, one of the things that is most pernicious
 about dependence is the way in which it fosters certain kinds of
 vice - overcautiousness, secretiveness and so on.
 If this is why such ideals are important then it is possible to
 see why the public expression of them is important as well.
 If independence from the arbitrary use of power is to be
 38 I take the general idea that institutions might be justified by consider
 ations of the ways in which they affect people's character to be an important
 insight from the civic republican tradition in political philosophy /political
 theory. But it is reasonable to ask what sort of evidence might be brought in
 favour of specific claims of this sort, like the one I am relying on here.
 Within the civic republican tradition, one sort of source of support has often
 been an appeal to historical examples - but this is unlikely to be helpful
 when we are considering proposals for new kinds of institution. Another
 possible source of support would be in empirical (social) psychology.
 Equally, though, empirical psychologists have a tradition of being sceptical
 about the very notion of character - and this has sometimes been thought to
 present problems for the relying on anything at all like the notion of a
 character trait in moral or political philosophy - though not always with
 very good reason. (See for example, Harman, G., 'Moral Philosophy Meets
 Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error',
 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999), 315-331 and Sreenivasan,
 G.'Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution' Mind 111
 (2002), 47-68 for, respectively, a well-known expression of a sceptical view,
 and a well-informed critique.) I suggest that the best way of defending a
 view like mine would involve relying on two sorts of claim: one about the
 effects of institutions on actual behaviour, (which ought to be susceptible of
 empirical investigation in a fairly straightforward manner) and one about
 the influence of habitual behaviour on character - harder to investigate -
 though not for that reason deserving of being immediately dismissed - but
 far from novel, philosophically speaking. (For discussion of one illustrious
 advocate of such a view see Burnyeat, M., 'Aristotle on Learning to Be
 Good', in A.O. Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: University of
 California Press, 1980).)
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Thu, 12 Jul 2018 10:33:38 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 WHY PUNISH WAR CRIMES?  183
 important in promoting the development of virtues then it is
 important not only that people should in fact be independent in
 this kind of way but that they should be aware of so being. One
 way of making people more aware of this, and consequently
 less likely to be afraid of the possibility of dependence is for a
 commitment to preventing the arbitrary use of power to be one
 that is publicly expressed not only by individual members of the
 society but also by its institutions.39
 Two consequences of the account I have developed are
 worth drawing attention to. First, because of the part played in
 my account by the expressive role of trials as well as that of
 punishments of war criminals, the sort of expressivism which I
 have been defending here is not just a special case of a general
 expressivist justification of punishment. So the widely shared
 suspicion that there is something non-standard about the trial
 and punishment of war criminals is vindicated. On this account
 the justification for trying and punishing war criminals is par
 asitic on the existence of good reasons for enforcing the rule of
 law in the more general case. If such justifications did not exist
 then it would be hard to see why we should regard an expres
 sion of the sort of commitment which (on the view I am
 defending) is embodied in our practice as being valuable.
 Secondly, suppose we accept that a commitment to trying
 and punishing war criminals does embody a commitment of the
 sort I have suggested, and suppose we also think that the public
 expression of a commitment of this sort is valuable. We can still
 ask whether this provides us with even a prima facie justifica
 tion of the practice. Clearly, this raises many questions. How
 ever, we can notice that one strategy for objecting to the
 39 It may be that if this is the only way in which ideals of this sort are
 expressed then citizens will be unlikely to make a connection between war
 crimes trials and the municipal situation. If so, then it may be that more is
 needed to justify the practice of trying war criminals. The justification would
 work best in a society in which many institutions expressed the same ideals.
 However I am inclined to think that even in a society in which no other
 institutions expressed an ideal of this sort, there would be ways for indi
 viduals to make the relevant connection. One thing that is important in this
 context is that war crimes trials are high-profile, controversial, public events
 - precisely the sorts of events which are likely to make members of a society
 reflect on their significance.
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 expressive theory is now unavailable. This is to argue that the
 practice is only one of a number of different ways of expressing
 commitment to the same ideals, some of which might be pref
 erable on other grounds. This line of argument seems unat
 tractive on the present understanding of the expressive theory,
 because it is not clear that there are any other means of
 expressing this commitment which are not parasitic on engag
 ing in the practice. The best way to express a commitment to
 the rule of law is to subject to it even those who might otherwise
 think that they were likely to escape it.
 Still, it might be thought that an argumentative loophole was
 left. For someone might conceivably agree with what I have
 said about the expressive role of war crimes trials, and yet
 suggest that this provides us with a justification for trying war
 criminals but not for actually punishing them, in the sense of
 subjecting them to harsh treatment. However, I do not think
 that such a view is coherent.
 There are two reasons why not. The first connects with con
 cerns about sincerity that I have mentioned above. It would be
 difficult to see a society which engaged in war crimes trials without
 following those up with the normal consequences of trials - in
 particular, with punishment for the guilty as being sincere in its
 condemnation of the behaviour of war criminals.40 (Matters
 40 One referee has expressed reservations about this claim on the grounds
 that procedures such as truth commissions like the one which dealt with
 aspects of the apartheid regime in South Africa seem to provide examples of
 judicial procedures which are not followed up by punishment but which do
 seem to express a sincere commitment to some kinds of value. I am not
 entirely persuaded by this line of thought: it seems to me that there is
 certainly room to doubt whether such proceedings do succeed in expressing
 a fully sincere commitment to the values that they are designed to express.
 There may, of course be good pragmatic reasons - to do with the continued
 functioning of a certain society - why they are the best option in some
 circumstances. I am inclined to think that these circumstances are more
 likely to arise in the case of crimes committed against members of a given
 society by a particular political regime in that society than in the case of war
 crimes committed by a regime against members of another society. In any
 case, whether or not one agrees with these two points, the point about
 proportionality mentioned immediately below seems to be a further concern
 in the case of truth commissions.
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 might be somewhat different in a society that eschewed harsh
 treatment for all criminals - but as I explained in the intro
 duction, I assuming that the harsh treatment associated with
 punishment can be justified in some cases.) The second, which is
 not entirely unconnected, has to do with considerations of
 proportionality. It is generally accepted that for a system of
 punishments as a whole to be just, serious crimes should, on the
 whole, be punished more severely than less serious ones. On the
 assumption that if any crimes are serious, war crimes are, a
 system of punishment that allowed war criminals to be tried but
 not punished would involve gross violations of proportionality.
 VIII. VICTOR'S JUSTICE REVISITED
 Is this account of why the punishment of war criminals is jus
 tified subject to the Victor's Justice objection? I do not think so.
 There are two reasons for this.
 First, the fact that a form of punishment is applied dispro
 portionately to a particular group does not by itself undermine its
 expressive function. So, if the justification of a form of punish
 ment depends on this expressive function, this fact does not
 undermine its justification. This is an instance of a more general
 truth about expression. Consider as an analogy the expression of
 anger through shouting. The fact that someone does not shout
 every time they are angry does not stop their shouting from being
 an expression of anger on occasions when they do shout.
 Secondly, endorsement of the expressive account does not,
 on its own, commit someone to any independent general moral
 principles that might underpin a version of the objection. In
 this respect it is markedly different from the retributivist and
 consequentialist accounts which I considered earlier. Of course,
 someone who subscribed to the expressivist view might also
 subscribe to some general principle that could be used as a basis
 for launching the objection. But at least the expressivist account
 does not seem to contain within itself the resources for its own
 undermining. It is, to that extent, a coherent account.
 Still, it might be thought that this is not enough. An objec
 tion might run as follows. 'You have shown that an expressive
 account of punishment could explain why we have reason to
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 punish war criminals in the way we do. But you have not really
 shown that the Victor's Justice objection can be met. This is
 because the Victor's Justice objection is, precisely, an objection
 about justice; and you have not shown - in the face of strongly
 backed intuitions to the contrary - that these punishments are
 indeed just'.
 I think this objection to my view misunderstands - and to that
 extent underestimates the force of- the Victor's Justice objection,
 at least in the form that I have been discussing it. The objection is
 powerful precisely because it does not depend on one's possession
 of a prior well-grounded theory about which punishments are
 just. Nor does it rest simply on our response to persuasively
 formulated intuitions. Instead, it arises from considering the sort
 of justification which one might give for our current practices
 (along either consequentialist or retributivist lines) and showing
 that someone who attempts a justification along either of those
 lines is committed to principles which make the practice prob
 lematic. By contrast someone who offers an expressive account of
 the sort that I have been defending does not thereby commit him
 or herself to principles which undermine their account.
 Admittedly this leaves open the possibility that someone
 might object to the expressive account on independent grounds.
 Still it is worth making two points about this possibility. The
 first is that such objections will not show my view to be in a
 worse position than anyone else's: if they are based on princi
 ples which are independent of a commitment to expressivism,
 they will present a problem for more standard consequentialist
 and retributivist accounts as well. The second is that so far we
 are only talking about the possibility of an objection along
 these lines - rather than an actual objection.
 Still one might feel that the intuitions which gave rise to the
 initial formulation of the Victor's Justice objection might give
 grounds for an actual objection, rather than just the possibility
 of one. However, I think this overestimates the probative value
 of such intuitions. At best they give us a prima facie case for
 thinking that there is some principle in the vicinity which needs
 to be respected and which will explain and justify those intu
 itions. In earlier parts of the paper, I have discussed how ret
 ributivists and consequentialists might accommodate the
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 relevant intuitions, and how this might create problems for
 their view. In the following section I shall consider one way in
 which an expressivist might accommodate some of the intu
 itions, and argue that such accommodation does not present a
 problem for my view.
 First, though, I need to deal with a residual worry. My case for
 thinking that this account of the justification for punishing war
 crimes (in something like the way we currently do) will only be
 plausible if one thinks that the expressive account is not a version
 of retributivism. For I have argued that a retributivist cannot
 rebut the Victor's Justice objection. Since this is so, anyone who
 thinks that expressivism is a form of retributivism will have to
 hold that I have failed to answer the Victor's Justice objection.
 One theorist who thinks that something like this is true is
 Michael Davis.41 Davis argues that some forms of expressivism
 which he, following Igor Primoratz42 calls 'intrinsic expres
 sionist' views are liable to collapse into forms of retributivism.
 As he puts it: 'intrinsic expressionism...appears redundant', (p.
 319). Davis uses the term 'intrinsic expressionist' to describe
 views on which there is some internal connection between a
 punishment and what it communicates.
 According to Davis, on an intrinsic expressionist view, what
 punishments communicate is that the behaviour being punished
 is morally and legally deserving of punishment.43 But for this
 41 Michael Davis, 'Punishment as Language: Misleading Analogy for
 Desert Theorists', Law and Philosophy 10 (1991), 311-322.
 42 Primoratz, I., 'Punishment as Language' Philosophy 64 (1989), 187-205.
 43 Davis op. cit. pp. 317-318. Davis writes as follows: 'A just penalty
 (quite literally) entails the moral as well as legal condemnation of both
 criminal and crime. The judge must 'condemn' the crime - that is, state the
 penalty it deserves and 'condemn' the criminal (that is state that the criminal
 deserves the penalty)'. The context of this statement is that it occurs as the
 conclusion of an argument which is supposed to show that retributivism
 entails intrinsic expressionism. An argument with this as its conclusion can
 only be taken to show that its premises (in this case, a non-expressive
 retributive view) entail expressionism if this is a correct and complete
 characterisation of intrinsic expressionism. So Davis must take it this is a
 correct and complete characterisation of the view. Since this isn't a correct
 and complete characterisation of my view, my view does not fit his char
 acterisation of intrinsic expressionism.
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 kind of account to be plausible, he suggests, we must have an
 independent account of just punishment in the background. If
 the account is a retributive one, then the expressive account
 adds nothing - in fact, it is entailed by the truth of the retrib
 utive account.44 If, on the other hand, no retributive account is
 possible, then, since the connection between the justice of the
 punishment and what is communicated is supposed to be
 internal, no intrinsic expressionist view can be true either.45
 My view is not vulnerable to this line of argument, since it does
 not fit Davis' characterisation of intrinsic expressionist views.
 There are two reasons for this. The first is that I have focussed on
 the expressive role of war crimes trials rather than directly on the
 expressive function of punishment. The second is that on my
 account the justification of the punishment is not supposed to
 depend on the fact that the punishment communicates that the
 behaviour being punished is morally and legally deserving of
 punishment, but on the fact that it communicates a message about
 what sorts of norms the society doing the punishing adheres to.
 For intrinsic expressionists (at least as Davis characterises
 the view), punishment is both the medium of communication
 and the subject of part of the message communicated. This is
 why the account needs to be filled out with a retributivist ac
 count of justified punishment. On my view punishment is the
 medium, but not part of the subject matter of the message.46 So
 my view does not need to be backed up with a retributivist
 account and does not presuppose one. A fortiori it is not ren
 dered redundant by the (alleged) fact that it presupposes one.
 IX. DOES THE EXPRESSIVE ACCOUNT GENERATE A NEW
 'VICTOR'S JUSTICE' OBJECTION?
 It might be thought that the expressivist account contains some
 elements that make it capable of generating a version of the
 44 Davis op. cit., p. 320: 'Retributive punishments, as such, necessarily
 carry the same information as intrinsically expressive punishment'.
 45 Davis op. cit., p. 319 'intrinsic expressionism would contain a false
 element if no non-expressive retributivism were true'.
 46 Or at least, not part of those aspects of the message which play a role in
 justifying the punishment.
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 Victor's Justice objection. For it might be said that a system
 of trying and punishing war criminals should express a
 commitment to the principle of treating like cases alike as well
 as to the other sorts of ideals which I have argued are rightly
 expressed by such a system. But the facts that the proponent of
 the Victor's Justice objection point to suggest that it does no
 such thing.
 One way of responding to this objection would be to bite the
 bullet and deny that a legal system should embody a commit
 ment of this sort. However, this suggestion seems implausible.
 For it seems as though the requirement that like cases should be
 treated alike is a basic requirement of procedural justice, and as
 such one to which any system of trial and punishment should
 express.
 A different response seems more appropriate. This is to ac
 cept that there is a good case for thinking that a legal system
 should express an ideal of procedural justice; and then to note
 that in this case (at least if the objector is right) the requirement
 to express a commitment to procedural justice comes into
 conflict with other things that we might legitimately want from
 our system of trial and punishment. So what we need is some
 account of how we might rank the different sorts of ideal to
 which we might legitimately expect our penal regime to give
 expression in cases of conflict.
 The rationale which I gave earlier for wanting our legal
 system to express a commitment to preventing the arbitrary use
 of force seems to provide an answer in this particular case. I
 argued that a good reason for wanting our penal system to
 express such a commitment was because of the long-term ef
 fects that the fear of dependence can have on the development
 of the character of individuals. It is not so obvious that an
 unbending commitment to an ideal of procedural justice is
 significant in the same way. Indeed, one might suspect that the
 expression of such a commitment under all circumstances
 would be deleterious, rather than beneficial to the development
 of individuals - for example by teaching them that the legal
 system is liable to be inflexible.
 A slightly different sort of objection is also worth consider
 ing. Someone might ask whether, given the facts which the
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 Victor's Justice objection draws our attention to, we really can
 see the practice of punishing war criminals as expressive of a
 commitment to ideals of justice, rather than of a commitment
 to revenge. However this point can be rebutted by observing
 that the practice of punishing war criminals is expressive of a
 commitment to justice rather than revenge to the extent that the
 punishment is only handed out at the end of a process which
 follows juridical norms as closely as possible. An attractive
 consequence of this view is that it explains why it is important
 that war criminals should be tried as well as punished, even in
 cases where it seems beyond reasonable doubt that they are
 guilty.
 A further worry might remain. It is often alleged against
 consequentialist accounts of punishment that they are morally
 objectionable insofar as they treat offenders as means to an end
 rather than as ends-in-themselves. The objection seems partic
 ularly forceful against accounts in which the desired ends of
 punishment are achieved through the deterrent effect of the
 punishment on other potential offenders. Some communicative
 accounts seem immune to this objection: Duff, for example
 presents it as a virtue of his account that on his view the
 communication constituted by punishment is directed to the
 prisoner, rather than to anyone else.
 Since the account that I have presented does not preserve
 this feature of Duff s view, one might wonder whether the same
 sort of objection applies. If so, it seems a serious matter, since
 the Victor's Justice objection can be understood as being
 motivated by concerns which are not very far removed from a
 Kantian concern to treat individuals as ends-in-themselves.
 However, I am not convinced that the objection is a cogent one.
 One way of understanding the Kantian injunction not to treat
 people merely as means to ends but as ends-in-themselves is
 that it forbids treating them in ways (or more properly)
 according to maxims which they could not possibly endorse.
 However, although it may be clear that most war criminals
 would not endorse a maxim which entailed that individuals
 were to punished as part of a commitment to norms of justice, it
 is not at all possible that they could not do so. Indeed the fact
 that it is conceivable, even if unlikely, that such an individual
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 might come to accept their punishment as justified suggests that
 the reverse is the case. So I conclude that the sort of justification
 for the punishment of war crimes for which I have been arguing
 here is not incompatible with the Kantian principle, provided
 the latter is properly interpreted.
 X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
 The Victor's Justice objection is one reason for being sceptical
 about the moral justifiability of our present practice of
 punishing war criminals. I have argued that an expressive jus
 tification of this practice, when combined with an expressive
 account of the justification of war crimes trials, enables us to
 meet the objection. Clearly, though, I have not answered or
 addressed every reason we might have for scepticism about the
 punishment of war criminals. Articulating such reasons, and
 showing how the expressive justification for punishing war
 criminals might undermine them would no doubt be a difficult
 task. Still, if I what I have said here is along the right lines it
 may nonetheless be worth undertaking.
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